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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Samuel Barnes was charged with burglary and petit theft, and exercised his right 
to a jury trial. He was convicted of both offenses and was sentenced to concurrent 
sentences of six years, with two years fixed, for his conviction of burglary and 120 days 
for his conviction of petit theft. The district court retained jurisdiction, but subsequently 
relinquished jurisdiction and executed Mr. Barnes' original sentences. Mr. Barnes 
thereafter filed a motion for a reduction of his burglary sentence pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinaffer, Rule 35). The district court denied this motion. 
Mr. Barnes timely appealed from his judgment of conviction and raised three 
issues on appeal: whether the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
cumulative testimony from several witnesses identifying the figure in a surveillance 
video as Mr. Barnes; whether the prosecutor committed misconduct when he elicited 
testimony about a witness's opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt or innocence and of his 
character; and whether the district court abused its discretion when it permitted hearsay 
evidence from a witness despite an objection by Mr. Barnes. Additionally, Mr. Barnes 
asserted that, even if these errors are deemed harmless when taken in isolation, the 
cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. 
The State responded that the lay opinion testimony of several witnesses who 
stated their opinion that Mr. Barnes was the individual on the surveillance tape was 
proper because these witnesses were familiar with Mr. Barnes and because there was 
other testimony indicating that Mr. Barnes' appearance was different at trial than at the 
time of the taped burglary. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State never responded to 
Mr. Barnes' contention that this evidence should have been stricken, at least in part, 
because it was cumulative. (Appellant's Brief, p.18; Vol. 1 Tr., p.159, Ls.17-24.) 
Regarding the issue of the admission of George Keenworthy's hearsay testimony, the 
State counters that this testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, 
but was instead offered to show "context." (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) The State 
also relies on this interpretation of the testimony of Mr. Keenworthy to assert that the 
prosecutor in this case did not attempt to elicit a statement regarding Mr. Keenworthy's 
opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt, and therefore the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in 
this case. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify the nature of Mr. Barnes' actual claims on 
appeal and to further clarify that the record in this case does not support the 
interpretation of Mr. Keenworthy's testimony being urged by the State. While 
Mr. Barnes continues to assert that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of 
a fair trial, he will rely on the arguments presented in his Appellant's Brief and will not 
reiterate those arguments herein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Barnes Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted lay testimony from 
several witnesses expressing an opinion as to the identity of an individual 
captured on a surveillance tape when the video was provided to the jury and only 
one of the witnesses provided any additional information that would otherwise 
assist the trier of fact in making the determination of the identity of the person 
depicted on the surveillance video? 
2. Did the district court err when it permitted the State to introduce a witness's prior 
out-of-court statements because these statements were offered as proof of the 
matter asserted and Mr. Barnes objected to these statements as hearsay? 
3. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he deliberately elicited testimony 
regarding a witness's prior statements expressing an opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt 
and his character? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Lay Testimony From Several 
Witnesses Expressinq An Opinion As To The ldentitv Of An Individual Captured On A 
Surveillance Tape When The Video Was Provided To The Juw And Only One Of The 
Witnesses Provided Any Additional Information That Would Otherwise Assist The Trier 
Of Fact In Makinq The Determination Of The Identity Of The Person Depicted On The 
Surveillance Video 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Barnes has asserted on appeal that the admission of testimony from several 
lay witnesses, none of whom witnessed the actual burglary at issue in this case, 
identifying Mr. Barnes as the individual depicted on a surveillance tape was error. Only 
one of the witnesses who testified provided the jury with any additional information that 
would assist the jury in determining whether it was more or less likely that Mr. Barnes 
was the individual depicted on the surveillance video, and the one witness who did 
provide vague statements as to a change in Mr. Barnes' appearance did not provide 
information regarding that change in appearance that would otherwise assist the trier of 
fact. 
In response, the State asserts that these witnesses were familiar with 
Mr. Barnes, and that another witness had testified as to a statement from Mr. Barnes 
regarding how his appearance differed from that of the person depicted on the 
surveillance video. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-6.) However, the State's argument is 
misplaced because much of the relevant case law relied on by both Mr. Barnes and the 
State indicates that the content of testimony of the witnesses must, itself, contain 
additional information that would assist the jury in determining the identification of the 
individual depicted on a surveillance tape in order for such identification testimony to be 
admissible. Moreover, because the jury was provided with a photograph that the 
prosecutor asserted was what Mr. Barnes looked like at the time of the offense, the 
testimony identifying Mr. Barnes as the individual on the surveillance tape should not 
have been admitted. In light of the record in this case, the district court abused its 
discretion when it admitted the lay opinion testimony of several witnesses purporting to 
identify Mr. Barnes as the individual depicted in the video surveillance tape that was 
subsequently provided to the jury. 
B. The Testimonv Of Nearly All Of The State's Witnesses ldentifyina Mr. Barnes As 
The Individual Depicted On The Surveillance Tape Did Not Include Any 
Additional Information That Would Assist The Jurv In Determining The Identity Of 
The Individual Depicted On The Surveillance Tape And, Therefore. The 
Admission Of This Testimony Was Error 
The issue of the admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony, by witnesses who 
did not observe the actual commission of the offense, regarding the identity of a person 
depicted on a surveillance tape which has also been provided to the jury invades upon 
the function and province of the jury as the fact-finder is an issue of first impression in 
Idaho. In light of this, both Mr. Barnes and the State have looked to the holdings of 
other jurisdictions for guidance on this issue. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-18; Respondent's 
Brief, pp.5-6.) The State has asserted that the relevant case law from other jurisdictions 
cited as persuasive precedent for this Court supports the admissibility of the testimony 
at issue in this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) However, a review of this 
persuasive precedent and the record in this case does not bear out this assertion. 
Four separate witnesses were called upon to render their lay opinion as to the 
identity of the person depicted on the surveillance tape of the burglary: John Cowie, 
Rachel Orand, Tabitha Clausen, and George Keenworthy.' (Vol. 1 Tr., p.115, Ls.1-18; 
p.126, Ls.18-22; p.173, Ls.11-20; p.213, Ls.15-21.) As has been previously noted, 
Mr. Cowie, Ms. Orand, and Ms. Clausen did not appear to have any greater familiarity 
with Mr. Barnes than the jury would have by the time of the close of evidence. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16, Vol. I Tr., p.153, Ls.12-23.) None of the witnesses identified 
any special mannerisms or features that led them to conclude Mr. Barnes was the 
person depicted on the surveillance tape. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.115, Ls.1-18; p.126, L18 - 
p.128, L.2; p.171, L.3 - p.173, L.20; p.210, Ls.5-15; p.213, Ls.15-21.) Only one 
witness, Ms. Orand, provided any information regarding a change in Mr. Barnes' 
appearance between the time of the burglary and the time of trial - that Mr. Barnes 
"[looked] like he lost weight. He has a different haircut." (Vol. 1 Tr., p.127, L.22 - 
p.128, L.2.) As has been noted in the Appellant's Brief, this statement provides little, if 
any, information of the assistance to the jury. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18.) 
Much of the case law relied on by other jurisdictions confronted with the issue of 
the admissibility of lay opinion identification testimony of an individual in a surveillance 
video generally require that this testimony establish both the particular familiarity of the 
lay witness with the defendant and a change in appearance or other identifying feature 
that the jury would not otherwise be able to discern upon a review of the videotape 
evidence. See, e.g., Sanders v. US., 809 A.2d 584, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Dawson v. 
Sfafe, 658 S.E.2d 755, 760 (Ga. 2008); Rosanna v. Sfate, 934 P.2d 1045, 1048-1049 
(Nev. 1997). In these cases, the testimony of the lay witnesses included those 
' A fifth witness, Sherilyn Bell, was also asked whether she could identify the person 
depicted on the surveillance video, but she indicated that she could not make an 
identification from the recording. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.98, Ls.8-14.) 
identifying features of the defendant, or described the defendant's change in 
appearance, that would not otherwise be apparent to the jury and this testimony was 
therefore deemed to be helpful to the jury's understanding. Id. 
Here, nearly all of the witnesses testifying as to their opinion of the identity of the 
person on the surveillance tape did not support that identification with any information 
that was beyond the ken of the jury, such as identifying features that the jury would not 
otherwise be aware of or a particular change in appearance, within their testimony. The 
fact that Mr. Barnes did not think, upon being confronted with a still from the 
surveillance video, that he looked like the person depicted does not remedy this 
deficiency in the testimony of the witnesses, as has been suggested by the State. (See 
Respondent's Brief, p.6.) 
Additionally, the State provided the jury with a photograph of Mr. Barnes' 
appearance at the time of the burglary. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.190, L . l l  - p.191, L.5; p.263, 
Ls.17-18; State's Exhibit 11; Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) Even if this Court were to 
assume that there was a substantial change in appearance that would otherwise render 
Ms. Orand's lay opinion testimony regarding her identification of Mr. Barnes' admissible, 
the jury was provided with a picture of what Mr. Barnes' appearance was at the time of 
the alleged offense. As such, this change in appearance would no longer be 
inaccessible to the jury and Ms. Orand's testimony would not provide any assistance to 
the trier of fact. See Grimes V. State, 662 S.E.2d 346, 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
In light of the underlying record in this case, the district court abused its 
discretion when it admitted the lay opinion testimony of several witnesses purporting to 
identify Mr. Barnes as the individual depicted in the video surveillance tape that was 
subsequently provided to the jury. 
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The State To Introduce A Witness's Prior 
Out-Of-Court Statements Because These Statements Were Offered As Proof Of The 
Matter Asserted And Mr. Barnes' Obiected To These Statements As Hearsay: 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Barnes has challenged on appeal the admission of several out-of-court 
statements made by Mr. Keenworthy, admitted over Mr. Barnes' hearsay objections, 
that were made to police officers. These included statements that Mr. Keenworthy 
thought Mr. Barnes was a "clown" and that Mr. Keenworthy probably had stated to 
police that Mr. Barnes was guilty of the charges at issue in this case. These statements 
were being offered as proof of the matter asserted and did not provide context for the 
conversation or for Mr. Keenworthy's identification. 
B. Mr. Keenworthy's Prior Out-Of-Court Statements Renardinn His Opinion Of 
Mr. Barnes' Guilt And His Character Were Offered Bv The Prosecutor As Proof 
Of The Matter Asserted, And These Statements Therefore Should Have Been 
Excluded As Impermissible Hearsav Evidence 
As an initial matter, Mr. Barnes wishes to clarify for this Court the scope of the 
testimony of Mr. Keenworthy that is actually at issue in this appeal. The State has 
suggested that Mr. Barnes objected to the entirety of Mr. Keenworthy's testimony, citing 
to page 22 of the Appellant's Brief. (Respondent's Brief, p.1 I .) Mr. Barnes did, at one 
point on this page, cite to the entirety of Mr. Keenworthy's testimony, but not in the 
context of objecting to the entirety of this testimony as impermissible hearsay. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.22.) This citation was made in support the fact that nothing in any 
of Mr. Keenworthy's testimony at any point supports the finding that Mr. Keenworthy's 
prior statements fell under the non-hearsay categories as outlined in I.R.E. 801(d)(l). 
(Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Mr. Barnes does not cite to the entirety of Mr. Keenworthy's 
testimony when discussing the actual hearsay claims being raised on appeal, but rather 
has directed this Court to the portions of the transcript containing his prior out-of-court 
statements. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-23.) 
Regarding the substantive issue of the admissibility of Mr. Keenworthy's out-of- 
court statements at trial, the State has suggested that these remarks were only put forth 
in order to establish the "context" of Mr. Keenworthy's identification of Mr. Barnes as the 
individual captured on a still image of the surveillance video. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.12.) It is worth noting that the State has characterized all of Mr. Keenworthy's prior 
out-of-court statements as involving his relationship with Mr. Barnes. (Respondent's 
Brief, p l . )  While these statements partly dealt with Mr. Keenworthy's prior 
relationship with Mr. Barnes, they were by no means limited to this subject matter. 
In particular, the prosecutor asked Mr. Keenworthy whether he made statements 
regarding his personal belief in Mr. Barnes' guilt and his character. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.212, 
L.23 - p.213, L.5.) The following exchange took place between the prosecutor and 
Mr. Keenworthy: 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Did you say anything about [Mr. Barnes'] reputation? 
MR. KEENWORTHY: Oh, I'm sure I did. , 
PROSECUTOR: Did you say, and I quote, "I bet he did it"? 
MR. KEENWORTHY: Very possibly, yes. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Did you call him a clown? 
MR. KEENWORTHY: Yes. 
(Vol. 1 Tr., p.212, L.23-p.213, L.5.) 
While the district court indicated, after Mr. Barnes' initial objection to the 
presentation of Mr. Keenworthy's prior out-of-court statements as hearsay, that these 
statements were not being offered for proof of the matter asserted, but instead went to 
show the "context of the conversation," it is not clear that the district court maintained 
this rationale when it denied Mr. Barnes' subsequent hearsay objections. (Vol. 1 Tr., 
p.210, L.22 - p.211, L.19.) However, even if this Court were to assume that all of the 
hearsay statements were deemed admissible by the district court to show the context of 
the conversation, the district court's ruling that these statements were admissible would 
nevertheless be erroneous. First, what the prosecutor in this case was seeking to offer 
was not the context of the conversation, but the substance of the conversation itself. 
(Vol. 1 Tr., p.211, Ls.1-3.) Additionally, the statements made by Mr. Keenworthy 
regarding h k  personal opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt or Mr. Barnes' bad character do not 
provide a context for anything. The only thing these statements were being offered to 
establish was the substance of the statements themselves -that Mr. Keenworthy knew 
the defendant, believed the defendant had poor character, and believed that the 
defendant was guilty. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.210, L.22 - p.211, L.19.) Such a use of prior out-of- 
court statements is, by definition, hearsay and the district court erred when it permitted 
the State to elicit this testimony. See I.R.E. 801(c), 802. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Deliberatelv Elicited Testimony 
Reqardina A Witness's Prior Statements Expressina An Opinion Of Mr. Barnes' Guilt 
And His Character 
A. Introduction 
Contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, the statements deliberately elicited 
by the prosecutor regarding Mr. Keenworthy's personal opinion of Mr. Barnes' character 
and his guilty of the charged offenses were not elicited in order to show the context of 
Mr. Keenworthy's conversation with police or of his identification of Mr. Barnes from the 
still image of the surveillance tape. These remarks were elicited in order to place before 
the jury the substance of what Mr. Keenworthy had represented to police - that he I 
1 
thought Mr. Barnes had a poor character and that this witness personally believed that 
j 
I Mr. Barnes was guilty of the offense. The purposeful elicitation of these remarks was 
therefore prosecutorial misconduct that rose to the level of a fundamental error in this 
case. 
1 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Deliberatelv Elicited Testimony 
I Reaardina A Witness's Prior Statements Expressina An Opinion Of Mr. Barnes' 
I Guilt And His Character 
I Mr. Barnes has asserted that the prosecutor in this case committed misconduct 
that rose to the level of a fundamental error when the prosecutor deliberately elicited 
improper hearsay statements from Mr. Keenworthy that were specifically directed at 
I Mr. Keenworthy's personal opinion as to Mr. Barnes' guilt and his bad character. 
1 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-29.) The State has responded that this testimony was not 
hearsay, and that the prosecutor was merely seeking to provide the context of 
Mr. Keenworthy's identification of Mr. Barnes. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15.) 
As has been noted, the out-of-court statements wherein Mr. Keenworthy stated 
that he thought Mr. Barnes was guilty and that Mr. Barnes was a "clown" does not 
provide any context as to Mr. Keenworthy's identification, but was merely offered by the 
prosecutor to show that Mr. Keenworthy was familiar with the defendant, thought he 
was a bad person, and believed that Mr. Barnes was guilty of the offense. (See Point II 
(B) supra; Vol. 1 Tr., p.212, L.23 - p.213, L.5.) This is not only an improper hearsay 
purpose for admitting Mr. Keenworthy's out-of-court statements, but the remarks 
regarding the witness's opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt and his bad character are also 
improper because these remarks called upon the jury to base its verdicts on factors 
outside of the evidence and appealed to the passions and prejudice of the jury. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-29.) The deliberate elicitation of these out-of-court statements 
was prosecutorial misconduct that rose to the level of a fundamental error in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Barnes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
judgment of conviction and sentence in this case and remand this case for fur the^ 
proceedings. 
DATED this 2oth day of February, 2009. 
Deputy State ~ ~ G l l a t e  Public Defender 
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